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█ Abstract In the analytic tradition of the philosophy of emotions the folk notion of adequacy is under-
stood with regard to – at least four – different questions, viz. (a) a moral question, (b) a prudential ques-
tion, (c) an epistemic question, and (d) a fittingness (or correctness) question. Usually, the fittingness ques-
tion is treated as being the central one. I have some doubts concerning this assessment, particularly when 
it comes to substantial – interpersonal or cultural – controversies about whether a specific emotional re-
sponse is adequate or whether a specific event deserves the emotional responses it triggers. To approach 
these matters, I recommend first doing without the established distinctions, for they may prematurely 
tempt us into assessing the adequacy of emotional responses in terms of one of these categories thereby 
overlooking other features that deserve attention. Instead, I will start with the folk notion of adequacy 
and then refine stepwise the conceptual landscape to get closer to what the crucial issues of adequacy are. 
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of Emotions; Emotional Atmospheres; Existential Feelings; Adequacy of Emo-
tional Responses. 
 
█ Riassunto L’adeguatezza delle emozioni e dei sentimenti esistenziali – All’interno della tradizione analiti-
ca della filosofia delle emozioni la nozione comune di adeguatezza è presa in considerazione in relazione 
ad almeno quattro diversi problemi: (a) un primo è di carattere morale; (b) un secondo riguarda la discre-
zionalità; (c) un terzo è di tipo epistemico e (d) un quarto concerne l’appropriatezza (o correttezza). Di so-
lito, all’appropriatezza viene riservata maggiore importanza. Personalmente nutro diversi dubbi su questa 
valutazione, in particolare quando si tratta di dirimere questioni sostanziali – interpersonali o culturali –, 
se una data risposta emotiva è adeguata o se un dato evento merita la risposta emotiva che ha innescato. 
Per affrontare questi problemi, mi sento in primo luogo di suggerire di fare a meno delle distinzioni mag-
giormente in uso, poiché possono spiprematuramente a valutare l’adeguatezza delle risposte emotive nei 
termini una delle categorie già menzionate, trascurando quindi altre proprietà degne di attenzione. Inten-
do invece partire dalla nozione di adeguatezza propria del senso comune e poi gradualmente raffinare il 
panorama concettuale, per approssimarmi ai problemi fondamentali dell’adeguatezza. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Filosofia delle emozioni; Atmosfere emotive; Sentimenti esistenziali; Adeguatezza delle 
risposte emotive 
 
                                                                                                                                    
STUDI  
 
(α) Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Wachsbleiche 27 - 49090 Osnabrück (D) 
E-mail: achim.stephan@uos.de () 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale 
 
  Stephan 
 
2 
IN THE ANALYTIC TRADITION OF the phi-
losophy of emotions it is commonplace to 
emphasize that the question of whether or 
not a particular emotional response (E) is ad-
equate needs further distinctions and clarifi-
cations. The folk notion of adequacy can be 
understood with regard to – at least four – dif-
ferent questions, viz. (a) a moral question: Is it 
(morally) right to respond emotionally with E?; 
(b) a prudential question: Is it good for the 
emoter to respond emotionally with E?; (c) an 
epistemic question: Is it justified to respond 
emotionally with E?; and eventually (d) a fit-
tingness (or correctness) question: Is E properly 
tracking the (evaluative) features of the situa-
tion or object the emotional response is di-
rected at? Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson1 
argue convincingly that moral and prudential 
issues should not be confused with the issue of 
fittingness; and Julien Deonna and Fabrice 
Teroni2 make an equally strong point for the 
independence of the fittingness question from 
the epistemic question. 
In the current debate on the adequacy of 
emotions most participants, actually, take the 
fittingness question to be the leading one. I 
have some doubts concerning this assessment, 
particularly when it comes to substantial – in-
terpersonal or cultural – controversies about 
whether a specific emotional response is ade-
quate or whether a specific event deserves the 
emotional responses it triggers. In such cases, a 
seemingly innocent position about the meta-
physics of the fittingness relation is not of 
much help,3 particularly, if no-one is in the po-
sition to judge from a “God’s point of view” 
whether an emotional response really tracks the 
evaluative features of the corresponding situa-
tion. To approach these matters, I rather rec-
ommend first doing without the established 
distinctions as introduced above, for they may 
prematurely tempt us into assessing the ade-
quacy of emotional responses in terms of one of 
these categories thereby overlooking other fea-
tures that deserve attention. Instead, I will start 
with the folk notion of adequacy and then re-
fine stepwise – making use of less familiar no-
tions – the conceptual landscape to get closer to 
what, I think, are the crucial issues of adequacy. 
When suitable I will also allude to the more es-
tablished notions.  
 
█  Emotional responses with a fundamentum 
in re and a fundamentum in persona 
 
Amongst philosophers and psychologists 
there is widespread consensus that both 
longer lasting emotions such as, for instance, 
bearing a grudge or life-long grief, and brief 
emotional episodes such as a passing fear or 
joy are directed towards goings-on in the 
world – to events, situations, persons or ob-
jects – and present them in a specific man-
ner, that is to say, they have intentionality.4 
Emotions, however, do not only reveal as-
pects of the (external) world, but always also 
the particular subjective situation of the feel-
ing subject.5 If someone, for instance, is 
afraid of a danger (which is a way of present-
ing the world as dangerous – given one’s cop-
ing possibilities) she will also and at the same 
time feel threatened (which is a way of pre-
senting oneself as vulnerable – given the 
worldly event). Moreover, the fear refers to 
the fact that one’s core motives and desires 
are not satisfied, in this case, for security and 
corporeal integrity. If someone, on the other 
hand, grieves for an irretrievable loss, she will 
at the same time feel left behind and bereft. 
In bearing a grudge, we perceive something 
to be an offense against us – usually the ac-
tions or the comportment of another person 
who affects us by their cold manner. Con-
comitantly, we experience ourselves as disap-
pointed, attacked, treated with contempt or 
damaged by what the other person has or has 
not done. Our desire for respect and recogni-
tion has not been taken into account. 
Each instance of an emotional feeling is 
such an instance of feeling oneself in light of 
something, where the two poles (feeling-oneself 
and feeling in light of) are inextricably inter-
twined. The reciprocity of self- and world-
reference in emotional processes, which has to 
be conceived against the backdrop of cultural 
pre-figurations essentially constitutes the 
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meaning of emotions as the specific subjective 
evaluation of the world: by means of emotions 
the world, in a felt manner, is assessed with a 
view to those aspects which are of particular 
significance to the feeling person. 
With such a diagnosis we have set the 
frame for inquiring about the appropriate-
ness (or adequacy) of emotional reactions:6 
In order to assess whether an emotion is ap-
propriate we again have to take into account 
both the world and the subject, although in 
slightly different ways. Appropriate emo-
tions, as Jean Moritz Müller has put it,7 are 
grounded both in the matter (fundamentum 
in re) as well as in the person (fundamentum 
in persona). Furthermore they also seem to 
have a foundation in culture (fundamentum 
in cultu): for usually members of our (or an-
other) social environment show us whether 
they find our emotional reactions appropri-
ate and acceptable. 
In order to introduce and elucidate the 
various factors that play an important role 
with a view to considerations on the adequa-
cy of emotional reactions, I begin with a ra-
ther simple case: a winegrower who, in late 
summer, is looking forward to a particularly 
good grape harvest, hears of an impeding 
thunderstorm on the weather report, which, 
in all likelihood, will come with torrential 
rain and hail. He worries that the forecasted 
thunderstorm could ruin his harvest. As the 
first raindrops fall, he experiences inner agi-
tation and tension. Shortly thereafter, in light 
of the lemon-sized hailstones that begin to 
hit his house, these turn into full-blown fear, 
interspersed with flights of panic and despair. 
He also struggles with the thought that, pre-
viously, hail insurance had seemed inappro-
priately pricey and that he therefore had not 
taken out any insurance. After the thunder-
storm has passed, he inspects his vineyards. 
He is relieved to find that his best vineyards 
have not been hit. 
With the background of this brief epi-
sode, we can already identify some of the 
central components which are relevant to the 
considerations on the adequacy of emotional 
processes (cf. Figure 1):8  
The various emotional stirrings of the 
winegrower, the SUBJECT reacting emotional-
ly, are all directed towards something – the 
TARGET of these respective emotional reac-
tions. In general, the TARGET can be an 
event, a state of affairs, an object, another 
person, but also oneself. In this short vignette 
we encountered three emotions with three 
different objects: the winegrower’s fear of the 
potentially devastating thunderstorm, his an-
ger towards himself insofar as he struggles 
with his failure to have taken out an insur-
ance contract at the right time, and eventual-
ly his relief that most of his grapes have re-
mained intact. 
But why do the (three) TARGETS cause 
emotional reactions and, even more im-
portantly, why the particular ones mentioned 
here? Obviously they all touch on something 
that is of significance for the winegrower – 
the FOCUS of the emotions, i.e. the SUBJECT’s 
background concern that makes the emo-
tional response intelligible. Prima facie it is 
fully ripened grapes, but behind this lies the 
intention to make wine from them: good 
wine that can be sold all over Germany, to 
make a living on the profits thereof, to feed 
his family, to continue growing wine in his 
vineyards. So it is his own existence that is in 
focus; this is what he is concerned about.  
The emotional reactions of the wine-
grower seem plausible and thus appropriate, 
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since their TARGETS, that is, what they are 
directed towards (the thunderstorm, himself, 
the grapes), actually have properties that se-
riously touch on what is of significance for 
him (the FOCUS of his emotions):9 The thun-
derstorm bringing hail is threatening for him 
since it could destroy his harvest, his past 
failure to get insurance is annoyingly self-
inflicted, as it bars him from being compen-
sated for the damage expected, the intactness 
of the grapes is joyfully relieving, insofar as 
the expected devastation was avoided. So 
here everything is in order. The various as-
pects indeed touch upon the same FOCUS of 
his emotional reactions – his professional 
subsistence.10 
At the same time, an overarching pattern 
becomes evident in this episode, within 
which the individual emotional stirrings can 
be seen as parts of a greater coherent context. 
If this pattern were broken by some means or 
other there would be cause to start question-
ing, for instance, if ceteris paribus the wine-
grower did not feel relief in light of the fact 
that his vineyards were spared. It would be 
just as strange if the meaningfulness of the 
FOCUS of his emotional reactions did not also 
surface in other situations, for instance, if ce-
teris paribus he remained indifferent that a 
murder of crows eating his grapes or new EU 
regulations made selling his wine more com-
plicated. To sum up, only in such an over-
arching pattern does each individual emo-
tional reaction find its proper place.11 At the 
same time it contributes to the meaningful-
ness, which the FOCUS of the respective emo-
tional reactions possesses.12 
In our analysis so far, we see that the ap-
propriateness of an individual emotional re-
action (both as regards its type and its inten-
sity) is dependent on at least two factors. On 
the one hand, it must have a fundamentum in 
re, that is, the object towards which it is di-
rected must be “worth” being its TARGET; on 
the other hand, it must also have a funda-
mentum in persona, that is, the import of the 
FOCUS of an individual emotional reaction 
must be rooted in an overarching coherent 
pattern that results from a multitude of emo-
tional reactions. If one of these two founda-
tions is missing the emotional reaction ap-
pears to be, in some respect, questionable or 
inappropriate. 
Typical examples of emotional reactions 
that seem inappropriate because they lack a 
fundamentum in re, even though an over-
arching pattern becomes apparent which 
gives the individual emotional reactions a 
coherent frame, are, for example, the various 
phobias such as acrophobia, aviophobia or 
claustrophobia. Usually a person suffering 
from acrophobia will react equally phobically 
no matter whether they are on a high bridge, 
a church steeple or on a steep cliff in the 
mountains. Correspondingly, they feel great 
relief if they are no longer exposed to these 
situations. So even though emotional reac-
tions of this type seem to have a fundamen-
tum in persona, a fundamentum in re is hardly 
ascribable to them: The high bridge is se-
cured by a railing, statistically speaking, fly-
ing is much safer than ordinary road traffic, 
usually elevators do not get stuck etc. Gener-
ally, people with such phobias are well aware 
that there are no real grounds for their emo-
tional response, they realize that their phobi-
as are inadequate and in need of regulation. 
In fact, it is often for this reason that they 
turn to a therapist. 
Next to emotional reactions, which lack a 
fundamentum in re, there can also be emo-
tional reactions which lack (or seem to lack) a 
fundamentum in persona. This is the case 
when there are good reasons for doubting the 
actual significance of the seeming FOCUS of an 
emotional reaction for the subject. Whether a 
FOCUS actually has import for an emotionally 
involved SUBJECT can, as we have seen, hardly 
be found in an individual emotional reaction, 
but only in a whole plethora of emotional re-
actions to situations in which the same FOCUS 
is touched upon.13 In this sense, highly varia-
ble reactions with a seemingly unchanging 
FOCUS – indifference versus serious concern 
that something particular happens – can indi-
cate a lacking coherent fundamentum in per-
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sona. Fluctuations of such an extent would at 
the same time puzzle others with regard to the 
seriousness of the motives of the involved SUB-
JECT or call into question the stability of their 
personality. It may, however, be due to rapidly 
changing perspectives on the world – as is ob-
servable in borderline personalities – that 
even some of these reactions have a funda-
mentum in persona. 
The fluctuations in a SUBJECT’s emotional 
reactions concerning the same or similar 
TARGETS with a seemingly unchanging FO-
CUS can also be grounded in an underlying 
ambivalence. However, ambivalent emotion-
al reactions need not be erratic, they may 
have a fundamentum in persona. Certain 
events give cause for both positive as well as 
negative emotional reactions. In this sense, 
one and the same TARGET (e.g. the marriage 
of one’s daughter to her beloved boyfriend; 
being offered a professorship at a reputable 
university) can make one very happy and at 
the same time entail consequences that one 
deeply regrets or worries about (in case of 
one’s daughter’s marriage, she could move 
far away so that only few opportunities re-
main for meeting her; taking the professor-
ship at the reputable university could necessi-
tate commuting and be a hindrance to con-
tinuing family life as one would like to, to 
jointly raising kids, for instance, because 
one’s partner is professionally tied to one’s 
family home etc.). In such cases, in German 
we figuratively speak of seeing them with one 
“laughing” and one “crying eye”. If the posi-
tive (or the negative) aspect outweighs the 
other, emotional reactions are imbued with a 
slightly contradictory coloring, the dominat-
ing tone, however remains stable. Sometimes, 
however, both emotional reactions are genu-
inely in equilibrium. What is positive about 
an event is completely balanced out by the 
negative aspect. In such ambivalent situations, 
especially in the context of difficult decisions, 
the pendulum between agreement and disa-
greement can oscillate wildly without warrant-
ing the conclusion that the emotional reaction 
does not have a solid fundamentum in persona: 
the SUBJECT is simply torn between the op-
tions. The situation is ambivalent in virtue of 
conflicting and equally important FOCI with 
respect to one and the same TARGET, and as 
such the ambivalent emotional reaction is ap-
propriate in the situation. 
 
█  Emotional responses from different per-
spectives 
 
You may have noticed that I rather vague-
ly made use of the notions of “appropriate-
ness” or “adequacy” when first commenting 
on the little vignettes. In fact, we have to dis-
tinguish a variety of remarkably different 
cases, for which, accordingly, different no-
tions of adequacy should be introduced. In 
the following I discuss four constellations 
with regard to the technical notions intro-
duced thus far, which are amended with 
third party perspectives that will pave the 
way to cultural aspects. 
Remember first the case of phobias: alt-
hough the emotional reaction has a funda-
mentum in persona, it has no fundamentum in 
re, and even more, this is not only noticed 
and acknowledged by third parties, but often 
also by the emotionally involved SUBJECT 
herself. Neither third parties nor the SUBJECT 
treat the emotional reaction as adequate. The 
TARGET does not deserve the emotional reac-
tion – it is not fitting and the SUBJECT knows 
it. Therefore, we should regard these reac-
tions indeed as inadequate emotional occur-
rences. Some philosophers, however, argue 
that even in cases like those of phobias, we 
should attribute some minimal rationality to 
the SUBJECT’s emotional reactions.14 Given 
that in some situations the world appears to 
be dangerous to the SUBJECT (or the subject 
perceives it to be dangerous) and further-
more, given that her emotional reaction has a 
fundamentum in persona, it should be judged 
to be (minimally) adequate for her to feel 
fear or to be frightened. I myself hesitate, 
however, to enlarge the space of adequacy (or 
rationality) for also capturing cases like 
these. The phobic (emotional) reaction is ir-
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rational given what the SUBJECT believes 
about the true dangerousness of the situation 
and given what she wants to do. She can’t 
control or regulate her emotions according to 
her own beliefs and convictions. These emo-
tional reactions play their own game.  
There is a closely related but in important 
aspects different second case, in which the 
emotional reactions of a SUBJECT again have 
a fundamentum in persona, while third par-
ties notice and acknowledge that the reac-
tions have no fundamentum in re. In contrast 
to the first case, however, here the SUBJECT 
(as the only one in town) insists that her 
emotional reactions have a fundamentum in 
re, e.g. when a SUBJECT reacts extremely an-
grily and justifies her reaction by insisting it 
is a response to what somebody else did, and 
that that was an offense. In cases like these 
we might say that the emotional reaction of 
the SUBJECT is intra-subjectively adequate 
given how the world appears to her. Given 
how she conceives of the corresponding situ-
ation, the emotional reaction is plausible. 
What may not be plausible is how she per-
ceives the world and conceives of the situa-
tion, that’s why we would say that her reac-
tion is not inter-subjectively adequate.15 
Prima facie, there are two more cases to 
be considered (secunda facie there are even 
more; I will get to those below.). The 
straightforward case is, of course, the oppo-
site to the first, the phobic case, i.e., when an 
emotional reaction has both a fundamentum 
in persona and a fundamentum in re, and 
when also both the SUBJECT and third parties 
acknowledge that it has a fundamentum in re 
– that, then, is a case for genuinely adequate 
emotional reactions – being intra- and inter-
subjectively adequate.  
What remains to be considered is the case 
where a SUBJECT treats her own emotional 
reactions as being inadequate whereas third 
parties may judge it to be adequate. In par-
ticular, this might occur when the SUBJECT 
falls short of her own normative standards 
while emotionally reacting in a way that 
might nevertheless be fitting with regard to 
the situation (e.g. by reacting atypically an-
grily towards someone who repeatedly be-
haved unfairly). Here, we have an emotional 
reaction that is inter-subjectively adequate, 
while it appears intra-subjectively inade-
quate. Things get even more complicated, 
when we enlarge our considerations to cul-
tural differences, which move us into possi-
bly opposing inter-subjective stances. 
 
█  Emotional responses and their fundamen-
tum in cultu 
 
Judgments of the appropriateness of 
many emotional reactions are made in a cer-
tain cultural context, which can range from 
family traditions at the small-scale to societal 
currents at the large-scale. Within this con-
text – especially with a view to public social 
interaction – it is more or less implicitly “de-
fined” whether a certain annoying event 
should give cause to reactions such as indig-
nation or anger or whether it can be tolerat-
ed. Conversely, the same holds for praisewor-
thy action or ones to be evaluated positively. 
There are also implicit cultural rules that de-
fine to which degree and by means of which 
form of expression, for instance, a great per-
sonal loss is to be grieved. While for several 
emotions there seem to be virtually universal 
ideas of how their appropriateness is to be 
assessed, it is beyond doubt that there also 
exist massive differences (or changes) with 
regard to the evaluation of some other emo-
tional reactions to comparatively similar 
events, both between different cultures as 
well as between different epochs within the 
same cultural current. Partly this is tied to the 
(also essentially culturally pre-figured) ques-
tion of what is considered to be stylistically 
impeccable, morally prescribed, permitted or 
prohibited. In this sense, today we find it 
hard to believe the fiery emotional reactions 
fuelled by moral indignation with which the 
1951 film Die Sünderin (The Sinner) as well 
as its lead actress Hildegard Knef were met:16 
the archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Joseph 
Frings, condemned the film in a pastoral let-
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ter, which was publicly read in February as 
the film premiered. Priests threw stink 
bombs in cinemas and politicians distributed 
leaflets with headings such as “The Sinner – 
an offense to any decent German woman! 
Prostitution and Suicide! Are these supposed 
to be the ideals of a people?” How is this sit-
uation to be analyzed? 
The TARGET of the emotional reactions 
aiming in the same direction was the nation-
wide premiere of the film Die Sünderin; but 
the reactions were also directed at the cine-
mas in which the film was shown as well as at 
the actors involved and the director. The rea-
son why the film became the TARGET of 
these intense emotional reactions can be seen 
in the statements of those involved: It 
touched on “public moral standards” or what 
could be seen as the ideals of a people. In 
what the film shows these people saw these 
ideals as violated and damaged. For this rea-
son, they considered the film and the behav-
ior of those involved in its production and 
distribution to be “offensive”. At the same 
time, they considered the FOCUS of their 
emotional reactions – public moral standards 
– to be of the utmost importance, both for 
themselves and for society in general. If one 
takes into account the FOCUS and its signifi-
cance for those feeling indignation, their re-
action appears comprehensible in a certain 
manner. The TARGET of their indignation 
indeed has properties that could call into 
question the moral standards (presupposed 
by them). 
However, what, according to our con-
temporary understanding, makes these emo-
tional reactions appear inadequate is the fact 
that we (no longer) share the FOCUS presup-
posed at the time. The coordinate system in 
terms of the question of what can be seen as 
morally acceptable behavior and what signif-
icance this has for public life has, in the 
meantime, shifted significantly. What was 
seen as significant for public moral standards 
sixty years ago has lost this significance. 
Against the backdrop of our now very liberal 
culture, we no longer ascribe properties to 
the film that could give cause for indigna-
tion: it isn’t offensive. We would react nei-
ther to the behavior of the Sinner nor to simi-
lar actual behaviors of other people with in-
dignation. In this sense, the condemning 
emotional reactions no longer have a funda-
mentum in re with a view to the contents of 
the film.17 
A similar tension between the emotional 
reactions of others and one’s own assess-
ment, just as we have seen it with reference 
to events that took place in Germany sixty 
years ago, can also be felt in the present when 
we take a look at subcultural enclaves in our 
own country (or elsewhere) and, for instance, 
hear that actions perceived as violations of 
honor repeatedly lead to excessive outbursts 
of violence or that young couples in Iran are 
faced with indignation and aggression by 
self-appointed guardians of “decency” just 
because they dared to hold hands in public. 
These emotional reactions, too, have no fun-
damentum in re according to our own cultur-
al background. The fundamentum in persona 
that they no doubt have is usually scaffolded 
by a fundamentum in cultu that those in-
volved emotionally share with some (or even 
many) who feel the same way. It could hardly 
establish itself in persona without this (sub-) 
cultural background. 
Without doubt, considering the – as we 
have seen, indispensable – cultural dimen-
sion will lead to further intricacies, when dis-
cussing the adequacy of emotional reactions. 
Some emotional reactions seem to have their 
fundamentum in re only against the back-
ground of corresponding specific cultural 
imprints: there, it is the particular cultural 
framework that establishes and defines the 
significance of the FOCUS for all members of 
such an emotionally affected social group 
and hence for each of its single subjects; and 
it is this FOCUS that underlies their various 
emotional reactions (the FOCUS, then, is truly 
affected by the TARGETS of their emotional 
reactions, and insofar their emotional reac-
tions have a fundamentum in re). This issue 
definitely deserves further consideration and 
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analysis. Though, we can see already, that 
emotional reactions or intuitions per se won’t 
be suitable for deciding between radically 
conflicting reactions and attitudes: As little 
as we find offense today in the movie Die 
Sünderin – against the background of our 
own cultural imprint – as much was it a cause 
for indignation for many people of our 
grandparent’s generation. To assess the ade-
quacy of such antagonistic emotional reac-
tions in a way that does not refer to empty 
culture-relativistic flowery phrases, we will 
presumably need for reasons that do not rely 
on affects themselves. 
Definitely critical are situations in which 
we see a tension between the immediate 
emotional reactions of an individual and the 
demands of his or her social environment, 
particularly if these demands (or habits and 
practices) seem to come at the expense of the 
mainly concerned subject. Bowlby has exten-
sively commented on this issue with regard 
to tolerating feelings of anger in the context 
of grief aroused by the loss of loved ones: 
«The frequency with which anger occurs as 
part of normal mourning has, we believe, ha-
bitually been underestimated – perhaps be-
cause it seems so out of place and shame-
ful».18 Elaborating this point in more detail 
he writes: 
 
There is now evidence that the most in-
tense and most disturbing affects aroused 
by loss are fear of being abandoned, 
yearning for the lost figure, and anger that 
she cannot be found – affects linked, on 
the one hand, with an urge to search for 
the lost figure and, on the other, with a 
tendency to reproach angrily anyone who 
seems to the bereaved to be responsible 
for the loss or to be hindering recovery of 
the lost person. With his whole emotional 
being, it seems, a bereaved person is 
fighting fate, trying desperately to turn 
back the wheel of time and to recapture 
the happier days that have been suddenly 
taken from him. So far from facing reality 
and trying to come to terms with it, a be-
reaved person is locked in a struggle with 
the past. Plainly, if we are to give the kind 
of help to a bereaved person that we 
should all like to give, it is essential we see 
things from his point of view and respect 
his feelings – unrealistic though we may 
regard some of them.19  
 
What Bowlby has in mind here, is what 
some while ago Sigmund Freud has dubbed 
“psychical reality”20 (in contrast to material 
reality) and what in a slightly modified form 
Heinz Hartmann has called “inner reality”.21 
Both emphasize that imaginations of any 
kind are psychically real and for our mental 
condition are of the greatest importance, 
even if it is directed at (and presupposes) un-
realistic scenarios (such as unrealizable long-
ing or the non-addressable anger mentioned 
above). Even if, after all, such strong emo-
tions as unquenchable longing or immoder-
ate anger seem to have no fundamentum in 
re, it may make sense that the social envi-
ronment withdraws the commonly accepted 
claim that our emotional reactions should 
have a fundamentum in re and rather accepts 
the feelings of the bereaved person in all its 
facets. According to Bowlby, feelings such as  
 
[y]earning for the impossible, intemper-
ate anger, impotent weeping, horror at 
the prospect of loneliness, pitiful pleading 
for sympathy and support […] are feelings 
that a bereaved person needs to express, 
and sometimes first to discover, if he is to 
make progress. Yet, these are all feelings 
that are apt to be regarded as unworthy 
and unmanly. At best to express them 
may seem humiliating; at worst it may be 
to court criticism and contempt. No won-
der such feelings so often go unexpressed, 
and may later go underground.22  
 
From Bowlby’s diagnostic findings we 
may conclude that some emotional reactions 
should be treated as appropriate even when 
they appear “unfitting” or when they seem to 
violate cultural norms and standards;23 par-
On The Adequacy of Emotions and Existential Feelings 
 
9 
ticularly so, if the expression of these emo-
tions and their experience plays an important 
role in the psychical health of the emotionally 
involved person (and provided that nobody 
else is harmed by these emotional reactions). 
So, what then, is different here, compared 
to the case of the phobic person? The feelings 
of the bereaved person usually have a funda-
mentum in persona, and they seemingly lack a 
fundamentum in re. The apparent lack of a 
fundamentum in re is often acknowledged by 
both the SUBJECT and by third parties. So, 
why not say again that the seemingly unfit-
ting emotional responses are inadequate tout 
court? What is the reason for Bowlby to take 
a different stance towards the bereaved per-
son than the phobic person? Among other 
things it has to do with the therapist’s caring 
viewpoint: if the SUBJECT’s well-being is of 
primary import, if we think of her space of 
possibilities as what should count, then we 
notice a distinction between the two cases. 
The phobic is in another sense a “bereaved 
person”, she has e.g. to forego against her 
own will a hiking tour, say, in the Alps even 
where her children happily continue their 
walk on a hilly path. She can’t counteract and 
control her feelings of fear or panic that 
harmfully shrink her possibilities. Thus, 
plainly, having these feelings is inadequate 
for all parties. The truly bereaved person 
who has lost a close partner or friend, on the 
other hand, would increase her possibilities if 
she would permit and accept her feelings. She 
was and is able to control or suppress her 
feelings of longing and anger towards the lost 
person; but it seems to have import, first, to 
acknowledge these feelings to overcome 
them on the long run, and to regain a bal-
anced life and affectivity. That is why third 
parties and the SUBJECT should give up en-
forcing the suppression of these emotional 
reactions, even if they miss a fundamentum 
in re. Thus, permitting and accepting these 
feelings should count as transiently appropri-
ate from a prudential perspective; if they car-
ry on forever, something went wrong, but 
expressing them, feeling them, is of the 
greatest importance to overcoming them in 
the long run. 
 
█  Existential feelings from perspectives of 
adequacy 
 
Emotional reactions that occur in cases of 
the loss of loved ones resemble a couple of fea-
tures that characterize distressing (and ago-
nizing) existential feelings as they sometimes 
appear in psychopathological states. In con-
trast to emotions, existential feelings are not 
directed towards anything specific; rather, they 
disclose – in a far more general form of affec-
tive intentionality – the world as a whole. As 
background orientations they structure our 
more specific encounters with the world – 
how and what we perceive, feel, experience, 
think and act.24 In that sense their appropri-
ateness has to be explored and assessed in a 
different way.  
It is mainly the merit of Matthew 
Ratcliffe to have made clear what essential, 
although often hidden role existential feel-
ings play in our daily affairs, how they change 
in psychopathologies and what that means 
for the patients. He also provided the follow-
ing listing, which gives a first impression of 
the spectrum of existential feelings:  
 
The world as a whole can sometimes ap-
pear unfamiliar, unreal, distant or close. It 
can be something that one feels apart 
from or at one with. One can feel in con-
trol of one’s overall situation or over-
whelmed by it. One can feel like a partici-
pant in the world or like a detached, es-
tranged observer staring at objects that do 
not feel quite “there”. Such relationships 
structure all experience.25  
 
Elsewhere, I have made suggestions re-
garding how to structure the huge variety of 
existential feelings and to differentiate be-
tween some important classes of these feel-
ings.26 Accordingly, we should distinguish el-
ementary existential feelings from non-
elementary ones – and, as a contrast class, 
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atmospheric feelings from both. Elementary 
existential feelings remain largely unnoticed 
under normal life circumstances. They are in 
the background of our affective lives and 
provide us with a sense of reality: of our-
selves, our actions, other persons and objects, 
and the surrounding world as such. Feelings 
of this sort, however, can change. In particu-
lar, they are distorted in specific ways in psy-
chopathologies that go along with a decrease 
or complete loss of common feelings of reali-
ty. Thus, in depersonalization disorder one’s 
own reality is not felt any more in a proper 
way: the (normal) agent’s perspective on the 
world is gone, subjects experience very flat 
affectivity, and in the worst cases, they might 
even develop the feeling of being dead al-
ready. In schizophrenia and derealization ep-
isodes, the reality of the world as a whole is 
shaken to the core – the reference to the 
world, in general, or to other human beings is 
affected, and in major depression the imme-
diate grip on the world is gone, the feeling of 
agency (or of being an agent within a world 
full of possibilities) fades away. For those 
who undergo these alterations the whole 
framework of experience – perceptions, feel-
ings, and agency – changes dramatically.27 
In contrast, non-elementary existential 
feelings can change without involving any se-
vere distortion from normal mental function-
ing. Nevertheless, do they, too, structure our 
space of possibilities in the background of our 
attention. They comprise feelings that con-
cern one’s own vital state (such as feeling 
healthy and strong, versus feeling exhausted 
and weak), or that reflect one’s position within 
social environments (such as feeling welcome 
and familiar, versus feeling disrespected and 
rejected), or that manifest one’s standing to-
wards the world in general (such as feeling at 
home or as a participant in the tide of events, 
versus feeling disconnected, like a stranger or 
not at home in this world). Most of these feel-
ings, and particularly the more negative ones, 
can also occur within those very time spans in 
which elementary existential feelings have 
shifted to non-normal conditions. In general, 
all background feelings can appear in complex 
blending.  
In contrast to both elementary and non-
elementary existential feelings, atmospheric 
feelings relate to specific events and situations, 
and thus, we are more aware of them than of 
existential feelings proper. Like existential 
feelings, they pre-structure our interactions 
with others and the world – often, however, 
only in the very situation in which they are 
triggered. As existential feelings, atmospheric 
feelings also comprise self-related feelings 
(such as feeling looked at), feelings that con-
cern our social environment (such as feeling 
an open and friendly atmosphere while giving 
a talk), and feelings that relate to the world in 
general (such as feeling agitated in the middle 
of a nervous and uproarious city-center).28 
As we have seen, existential feelings are 
not directed at some specific event or object. 
Insofar as they have no genuine TARGET – 
i.e., for constitutional reasons they can’t have 
a fundamentum in re – and hence they have 
no FOCUS.29 Some existential feelings, as they 
are salient in depression, (or the state of be-
ing depressed) might have, however, a severe 
impact on how we emotionally react towards 
the world. Thus, what seems inadequate in 
depression is that many patients do not feel 
anything when they should feel something or 
when they should react emotionally.30 In 
these cases the TARGET would still deserve to 
lead to an emotional reaction; it still touches 
on the (former) FOCUS of the SUBJECT, but 
the FOCUS has no longer any import for the 
SUBJECT. Thus, for third parties it still looks 
as if the SUBJECT should care for her FOCUS, 
therefore it is inter-subjectively inadequate 
to not show emotional reactions. For the 
SUBJECT, however, it is intra-subjectively ad-
equate to show no emotional reactions, due 
to the fact that the FOCUS on which the TAR-
GET touches, has lost its import for her. 
From a widened perspective (or on an-
other level) existential feelings may be at 
odds (or in line) with a FOCUS that is still of 
great importance for a SUBJECT. In such a 
case, existential feelings will themselves – 
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qua background feelings – become the ob-
jects of appraisals and emotional reactions. 
Thus, we may notice a severe tension be-
tween what, on the one hand, our existential 
feelings reveal about our space of possibilities 
in general, and how, on the other hand, we 
ideally would like to be and behave (accord-
ing to some second order volitions). If, for 
example, it is of great importance to us that 
we understand ourselves as agents that are in 
control of the tide of events and are able to 
do what corresponds to our main concerns in 
a responsible and self-determined way, then 
background feelings that signal to us feeble-
ness, impairment, and the loss of our capacity 
to act, may evoke intense unease, and even 
anxiety, despair, or panic. If these alterations 
are mainly those of non-elementary existen-
tial feelings and (perhaps) due to a three-day-
virus, we may take notice of them in a rather 
even-tempered fashion – knowing that we 
are just undergoing a transient malaise. 
Things look quite differently in the case of 
incapacities to act in consequence of burn 
out or major depression, which are not expe-
rienced as momentary and passing. Here, we 
perceive the corresponding existential feel-
ings (and the general condition we are in) to 
be truly alarming and in dire need of modifi-
cation. While, after all, we may appraise the 
exhaustion and lassitude that go along with a 
common cold – given the corresponding 
state of health – even as “adequate”, states of 
being detached from the world that go along 
with depression or fundamental alterations 
of our sense of reality that go along with de-
personalization or derealisation disorders do 
not appear acceptable, not least due to their 
persistence that is hardly organically com-
prehensible. We don’t want to have such feel-
ings, since they present to us the world and 
the space of our possibilities in a “crack-
brained” way. This means that (implicitly) 
we don’t see them as adequate either. These 
feelings just aren’t good for acting in the 
world. 
But also in these cases, we must learn to 
accept – just as in the case of anger in the 
context of mourning described by Bowlby – 
that the dominating existential feelings re-
flect the “inner reality” of the person con-
cerned and are to be accepted as what they 
are. Only then, as further steps we might 
consider how to bring these distressing un-
balanced existential background feelings 
back to poise. The possibilities for regulating 
such woebegone existential feelings, howev-
er, are more restricted than we might wish. 
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